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In the recent decades, businesses and organizations have consciously shifted to internal R&D
for advancing innovations as opposed to relying on licensing agreements with independent
scientists (Kim & Marschke, 2005). However, in spite of its benefits, an in-house approach to
R&D risks exposing innovating firms to undesired knowledge transfer through intra-industry
scientist movement. In this context, patents serve as a device that innovating firms may
use to discourage their scientists from joining or setting up a rival firm. Patents ideally aim
to grant the innovator an exclusive right to produce (use) the patented product (process).
However, in reality they provide only a partial property right (Shapiro, 2003). This means,
although they may not deter infringement, they allow patentees to establish the right to
extract applicable penalties from the infringer as remedial compensation for the injury
caused. The underlying damage measure and the likelihood of proving infringement in court
of law stipulate the expected amount of recovery in case infringement occurs. This paper
investigates the effects of a stronger patent regime on patenting and movement propensity
in presence of scientist mobility, and identifies the implications of increase in patent strength
on the profitability and required investment of an innovation project.
We develop a model of patenting and movement decision in which innovation is static and
certain1. The innovating entrepreneur develops a new product with the help of a scientist
aid and commercializes it to yield profits. Scientist mobility inflicts a loss in profit to the
innovator through unsolicited product market competition. To protect against potential
infringement, the innovator may choose to patent the innovation by incurring a cost. We
define damages á la the “lost profit” rule such that a part of the loss suffered by the
incumbent is recovered from the entrant in case the innovation is patented2. The strength of
1The structure follows the development in Kim and Marschke (2005).
2In the study of six jurisdictions, namely, the U.S., Japan, Germany, U.K., France and the Netherlands,
Reitzig et al. (2008) find primarily three types of damage award calculations that are prevalent with
minor variations across different legal systems. These are “lost profit”, which indicates the patent owner’s
reduction in profit due to infringement, “infringer’s profit” or “unjust enrichment”, which indicates the
profit accruing to the infringer due to infringement, and “reasonable royalty rate”, which indicates the
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the patent system, which is reflected in the reasonable success rate of a patent lawsuit and
the amount of patent infringement awards (Hu et al., 2020), determines expected amount
of reparation. Accordingly, we define the “measure of strength” of the patent system as
a function of litigation success probability and expected recovery proportion to analyze
the effects of a stronger patent regime on the innovator and the innovation in an industry
prone to scientist mobility.
Our results demonstrate that an increase in patent strength increases patenting propensity
but does not suffice to deter infringement and further, fails to reduce the probability
of such instances3. Nevertheless, even though a stronger patent system does not reduce
infringement, it seems reasonable to expect that it may protect the innovator through higher
damage recovery. Counterintuitively, we find that the expected profitability of the innovator
falls as the patent regime is made stronger, thereby weakening incentives to innovate4.
However, stronger patents augment the innovation’s R&D expenditure. Existing empirical
studies on the impact of patent strength on patenting and R&D spending indicate similar
effects. In conducting a survey of R&D managers and executives in the semiconductor
industry, which is an industry characterized by substantial scientist mobility, Hall and
Ziedonis (2001) find evidence of a causal relationship between greater patent strength and
increased patenting. Arora et al. (2008) study the effect of patent reforms on the Indian
pharmaceutical market and show that stronger patents increase R&D spending5. This
paper introduces a theoretical construct of patent strength in a framework of scientist
mobility and demonstrates that, in the aim of protecting against threat of infringement
from insiders, stronger patents are not only inefficacious but also unfavourable to profits.
The results suggest important considerations for patent reforms.
royalty rate that would have been applicable had the infringer entered into a licensing agreement with the
patent owner before infringement.
3We additionally test the ineffectiveness of stronger patents on mobility under exogenous patenting following
the closely related model structure in Ganco et al. (2015) to show that our finding is consistent for models
of endogenous as well as exogenous patenting.
4We suppose innovations are motivated by expected profits (as in Moser (2005)).
5In our model of certain innovation, increase in R&D expenditure manifests as increase in total wage bill.
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The intuition behind the results follows from the avenues through which a stronger patent
regime affects revenues accruing to the entrepreneur and the scientist from participating in
the innovation project. The first is a direct effect which increases expected loss recovery
from patenting, thereby increasing the patenting propensity of the entrepreneur. However,
a second effect, which is an opposing wage effect, counters this positive effect on the
entrepreneur’s expected profit. Higher anticipated reparation and more frequent patenting
increase the expected damage cost borne by the rival and reduce the scientist’s expected
returns from joining the entrepreneur’s project, through a reduction in gains from moving.
This necessitates a higher wage offer from the entrepreneur to match the scientist’s
reservation earning and impel him to join her initiative, thus generating a negative effect
on her expected profit. The two effects exactly offset each other, resulting in a decrease in
the entrepreneur’s profitability owing to a third effect generated by higher patenting costs
from more frequent patenting. Further, the entrepreneur’s R&D expenditure rises owing to
higher wage payments. For the scientist, an equal increase in the reparation cost and the
joining wage leaves total expected earnings from the project constant and thus renders no
change in movement behaviour.
Our paper is primarily a contribution to the literature on patent strength. The existing
literature on IPRs extensively studies patent strength in the context of optimal patent
length and breadth (Gallini, 1992; Gilbert & Shapiro, 1990), preferences of developed
vs. developing countries (Allred & Park, 2007; Chen & Puttitanun, 2005; Dinopoulos &
Kottaridi, 2008; Iwaisako et al., 2011) and patent reforms (Kanwar & Evenson, 2003; Kyle
& McGahan, 2012; Sakakibara & Branstetter, 2001). Evidences from theoretical as well as
empirical analyses have suggested that although stronger patents unambiguously increase
patenting, their role in protecting and enhancing innovation incentives is ambiguous (Bessen
& Maskin, 2009; Cohen et al., 2000; Hall, 2007; Hall & Ziedonis, 2001; Lerner, 2009). For
example, Falvey et al. (2006) empirically observe differential effect of patent strength on
innovation by a country’s income level. Encaoua and Lefouili (2005) suggest differential
patenting by innovation size using a theoretical model such that greater patent strength
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increases patenting propensity for medium innovations. Bessen and Maskin (2009) show
that stronger patents can inhibit innovation when innovation is sequential. We study
the effectiveness of stronger IPRs in protecting the innovator and the innovation when
innovating firms face infringement threat from movement of their scientists.
An optimal indemnification rule is one that attempts to increase innovation incentives
by sufficiently rewarding the innovator for his/her work while balancing the loss in social
surplus due to restricted use of the technology (Reitzig et al., 2008). Clearly, the two goals
are counteractive. Ayres and Klemperer (1999) suggest that some amount of uncertainty in
the patent system can work toward achieving this goal. Uncertainty in patent litigation is
well-established in the literature on damage rules. See, for example, Allison and Lemley
(1998), Anton and Yao (2007), Ayres and Klemperer (1999), Chen and Sappington (2018),
Choi (2009), Dey et al. (2019), Lemley and Shapiro (2005), Schankerman and Scotchmer
(2005), Shapiro (2003) and Shapiro (2016). According to Allison and Lemley (1998) only
54% of all litigated patents are found to be valid. Lemley and Shapiro (2005) discuss
the inherent uncertainties in the scope of patent rights and attribute them to inbuilt
mechanisms in the patent system that encourage excessive patenting. In analysing the
issues that potential reforms of the patent system should account for, they emphasize the
need to bear in mind the interest of the end parties that it affects. In this context, they
provide a rationale for incorporating the probabilistic nature of patents in economic models.
A probabilistic patent model may also be interpreted as a partial damage regime where
the patent owner is entitled to a fixed proportion of the entire damage amount (Ayres &
Klemperer, 1999). Our study models a damage rule with probabilistic patents where the
strength of the patent system determines the proportion of entrepreneur’s recovery from
her loss due to infringement6.
6Pecuniary penalties (“damages”) for patent infringement are a newly emerging area of interest in the
existing literature (Chen & Sappington, 2018). In a recent study on damage rules, Chen and Sappington
(2018) underscore the significance of regime design by proposing a linear combination of the “lost profit”
and “unjust enrichment” rules together with a lumpsum monetary transfer, and obtaining that the
welfare-maximizing linear rule is optimal among all rules that ensure a balanced budget in the industry,
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We consider scientist mobility to be the only potential source of infringement. The existing
literature on labour turnover and information diffusion widely proclaims scientist mobility as
a primary channel for knowledge spillover within industries (Agarwal et al., 2009; Almeida
& Kogut, 1999; Arrow, 1962; Rønde, 2001). Such knowledge flows can remain geographically
localized (Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Kaiser et al., 2015) or disseminate across regional borders
(Oettl & Agrawal, 2008). Incidentally, hiring of other firms’ scientists is an important
learning mechanism for innovators seeking knowledge across geographical and technological
borders (Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003). Pakes and Nitzan (1983) design an optimal contract
for hiring a scientist who can potentially move to or set up a rival enterprise and indicate
conditions under which it permits mobility in equilibrium. Kim and Marschke (2005) use
the framework of Pakes and Nitzan (1983) to study the relationship between patenting
probability of an innovating firm and mobility decision of its scientist. Emphasizing that
a substantial part of technological knowledge transfer happens through inter-firm labour
mobility, they underscore the role of patents in protecting an innovating firm from “insiders”.
Our paper attempts to understand how patent reforms aimed at protecting the innovator
affect innovation attributes and patenting propensity in presence of knowledge transfusion
due to scientist mobility.
In this study, we seek to establish an interrelationship between intellectual property rights
and scientist mobility. To the best of our knowledge, the only other studies that do so
are Kim and Marschke (2005), Hellmann (2007), Agarwal et al. (2009) and Ganco et al.
(2015). However, unlike the existing studies, we explicitly model patent strength as a
composite index comprising the strength of the specified law, reflected in the expected
recovery proportion, and the strength of enforcement, reflected in the litigation success
regardless of patent strength. Shapiro (2016) evaluates the effectiveness of the damage rule regime versus
injunction in the primary goal of protecting the patent holder and discusses circumstances under which
either remedy may be appropriate. For a discussion on the relative efficiency of “lost profit” and “unjust
enrichment” regimes under alternative counterfactuals and natures of innovation, see Anton and Yao
(2007), Schankerman and Scotchmer (2001, 2005).
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probability, to identify the effect of tighter patents on patenting, mobility and innovation7.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops and solves the base model
of innovation. Section 3 formalizes the effects of increase in patent strength on patenting,
mobility, innovation profitability and R&D expenditure. Section 4 summarizes the main
findings and concludes.
2 A Model of Innovation
We develop a model of innovation with endogenous patenting and movement following Kim
and Marschke (2005). Here, innovation is certain and static. Within this framework, we
additionally define the following – (i) a liability rule entailing damage recovery á la “lost
profits”, and (ii) an explicit measure of patent strength.
An innovating entrepreneur obtains an idea for a new product and can hire a scientist to
develop the idea into a tangible. There are two periods in the game. In the first period, the
scientist develops the entrepreneur’s idea into a usable product. In the second period, the
entrepreneur commercializes the product without any aid from the scientist and realizes
profits. The timing of events are as follows. At the beginning of the first period the
entrepreneur makes an offer to the scientist consisting of the first period wage w0 and
second period wage w1. The scientist, conscious that the entrepreneur will act to maximize
current returns when the second period arrives, accepts the offer if and only if his expected
pay-off equals or exceeds his reservation earning in the two periods combined. The scientist’s
reservation wage in each period is w̄. Optionally, at the beginning of the second period,
the scientist can use his knowledge from the first period to move to or set up a rival firm
that produces and markets a competing product in the second period. Let ρi (∈ R
+) and
ρe (∈ R) denote the revenues accruing to the entrepreneur (innovator) and the rival firm
(entrant) respectively in the second period 8. ρi and ρe are random variables having joint
7See Papageorgiadis and Sharma (2016) for an empirical analysis of patent strength and innovation using a
composite index of patent strength that comprises both stipulated law and enforcement strength.
8As in Kim and Marschke (2005), ρi is the ‘internal’ value of the innovation and ρe is the value of the
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density f , which is common knowledge.
Appearance of a rival reduces the entrepreneur’s second period revenue by λρi, λ ∈ [0, 1].
Hence, at the end of the first period, the entrepreneur can choose to patent the innovation
to insure herself against infringement, the nature and strength of patent laws determining
expected recovery. We define the “measure of strength” of the patent system as,
σ(r, δ) = r · δ
where, r ∈ [0, 1] denotes the probability of a successful litigation for the patentee and
δ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the proportion of damage recovery. Notice that when r < 1, the model
defined is one of probabilistic patents, and when δ < 1, the damage rule defined is one of
partial recovery. The composite strength measure σ and the “lost profit” rule of damage
measure together imply an expected recovery amount of σλρi, σ ∈ [0, 1], for the entrepreneur
in the event a rival appears and the product is patented. As an increase in σ could be
caused by either a more certain patent system implying greater chances of litigation success
for the patentee, or a stricter damage specification implying higher recovery amount, or
both, the implications of stronger liability laws (explored in the following section) apply to
either reform of the patent system. As the damage recovery cost is borne by the infringer
in case the product is patented, patenting reduces the rival’s gain by γρi where γ ∈ [0, 1] is
the coefficient of recovery and σλρi = γρi. The cost of patenting is c.
The values of ρe and ρi are realized at the beginning of the second period and become
common knowledge. The entrepreneur then makes the decision on patenting and second
period wage taking the scientist’s movement decision as given. If the scientist decides to
stay with the entrepreneur in the second period, he receives wage w1 and performs work to
generate value equal to his reservation earning w̄. Alternatively, if he joins or sets up a
rival firm his earning equals ρe (or ρe − γρi if the product is patented), which is the value
of his acquired knowledge to the rival, in addition to the value generated by his work w̄.
Finally, the scientist may move to a non-R&D sector in the second period where he earns
scientist’s knowledge to the rival, the ‘external’ value net of moving costs.
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w̄. Equation 1 gives the expected profit of the entrepreneur.
E(π) = − w0 +
∫∫
S,p=1




















where p is an indicator variable taking value 1 when the product is patented and 0 otherwise,
S is the set of ρe and ρi for which the scientist decides to stay with the entrepreneur, M is
the set of ρe and ρi for which the scientist moves to the rival and N denotes the set of ρe
and ρi for which the scientist joins a non-R&D sector
9. The entrepreneur hires the scientist
if her expected profit from the innovation project is positive. The scientist will join the
entrepreneur in the first period if his total expected earnings in two periods combined exceeds
his total reservation wage 2w̄. Equation 2 gives the scientist’s participation constraint:
2w̄ ≤ w0 +
∫∫
S,p=1




[ρe − γρi + w̄]f(ρe, ρi) dρedρi +
∫∫
S,p=0









The entrepreneur’s problem is to choose p, w0 and w1 to maximize (1) subject to (2). To
solve this, the first step is to solve for the second period choice variables: the optimal
second period wage, patenting decision of the entrepreneur and movement decision of the
scientist, for any given ρi and ρe. Let ρe = ρ̄e + ǫe and ρi = ρ̄i + ǫi where ǫe and ǫi are zero












S, p = 1
w1 = ρe − γρi + w̄
S, p = 0
w1 = ρe + w̄
S, p = 1
w1 = w̄
S, p = 0
w1 = ρe + w̄












ǫe2 = c− ρ̄e
Figure 1: Mobility, Patenting and Wage Decisions
mean random variables having joint density g, ρ̄e and ρ̄i are the constant means of ρe and
ρi respectively. Figure 1 depicts the optimal second period wage, patenting and movement
decisions on the ǫi − ǫe space. Detailed derivation of the figure is available in the appendix.
In the region above line A, the entrepreneur’s loss from the scientist moving is less than
the scientist’s gain from moving to a rival, regardless of whether the product is patented.
Hence, there is no wage at which the entrepreneur can optimally retain the scientist in the
second period and the scientist moves to a rival, receiving a return of ρe+ w̄ (ρe−γρi+ w̄) if
the product is not patented (patented). The entrepreneur patents the innovation when loss
recovery due to patenting exceeds its cost. In this case, patenting does not aid in preventing
establishment of the rival but is solely a device to reduce the entrepreneur’s loss when such
loss is sufficiently high. Between line A and line B, the entrepreneur’s loss from the scientist
moving exceeds the scientist’s gain from moving. Hence, the entrepreneur finds it optimal to
retain the scientist. Patenting reduces entrepreneur’s loss and scientist’s gain by the same
amount, thus having no effect on movement. In the region between line B and line C, the
scientist’s gain at the rival, even though higher than his reservation wage w̄ without patent,
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falls below the same when the product is patented. In both these cases (the region between
line A and line C), patenting works to reduce the second period wage that the entrepreneur
needs to offer in order to retain the scientist when such reduction is sufficiently high. When
the valuation of the scientist’s knowledge to the rival (ρe) is high (between line A and
line B), patenting reduces scientist’s gain through high anticipated loss recovery, whereas
when the valuation of the scientist’s knowledge is lower, patenting renders movement to
the non-R&D sector preferable, thus reducing incentive to move. When the valuation of
the scientist’s knowledge is sufficiently low to eliminate any possibilities of movement to
the rival, the entrepreneur always retains the scientist by offering the reservation wage and
never patents. This corresponds to the area below line C. It follows, patenting has a loss
reducing effect when the scientist chooses to move and losses are high, and a wage reducing
effect when the scientist chooses to stay and anticipated returns from moving are high10.
Substituting the optimal wage, patenting and movement decisions in (2) with equality gives
the optimal first period wage w0. Substituting w0 in (1) gives the expression for expected
profit in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. The expected profit of the entrepreneur from the innovation project is given as:













10Intuitively, the patenting and movement behavior under a regime of damage recovery from the rival, as
reflected in Figure 1, are congruent to that in Kim and Marschke (2005). For any given ǫi, the scientist
is more likely to move when ǫe is high inducing greater returns from movement. For any given ǫe, the
scientist is more likely to stay when ǫi is high as greater losses from movement compel the entrepreneur
to retain the scientist. Further, when ǫe is sufficiently low, patenting does not occur for any ǫi because
the scientist’s incentive to move is negligible. When ǫi is sufficiently low, patenting does not occur for
any ǫe as the entrepreneur’s potential loss from movement is insignificant.
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We saw that if the scientist decides to stay in period 2, the entrepreneur patents the
innovation to reduce his second period wage when such reduction is sufficiently high.
Intuition suggests that such reduction in wage increases the expected profit of the entrepreneur.
However, the second term in (3) implies otherwise. The reason is that any reduction in the
second period expected pay-off of the scientist, which in this case is the second period wage,
must be adjusted for by an equal increase in the first period wage that the entrepreneur
offers to prompt the scientist to join her firm in period 1. Again, if the entrepreneur patents
when the scientist decides to move in the second period, it reduces her loss in revenue due to
product market competition which implies a positive effect on profit. But the loss recovery
is extracted from the rival, lowering the scientist’s expected gain from moving and thus
entailing an equal increase in the first period wage. The two effects exactly cancel leaving
no net effect of patenting on entrepreneur’s expected profit when the scientist moves to
a rival firm in the second period, as implied by the third term in (3). Finally, the fourth
term represents the cost of patenting when the entrepreneur optimally decides to patent.
3 Stronger Patent Regime
A stronger patent regime implies higher expected amount of loss recovery from patenting
for the entrepreneur in the event that a rival product appears in the market. Patent reforms
aim at strengthening the patent system by not only increasing the coverage that patents
provide but also improving the assurance that they afford. A particular example is the
creation of the Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit under the U.S. Patent Reforms in
1982, a specialized court set up to handle issues on patent infringement and validity. After
the court’s creation, the number of validity and infringement findings that were upheld
on appeal rose to 90% as compared to the 62% before, whereas the reversal of decisions
of invalidity or no infringement rose to 28% from the previous rate of 12% before the
establishment of the court (Gallini, 2002; Jaffe, 2000).11 Certain patent systems also allow
11See Jaffe (2000) and Gallini (2002) for an overview of the U.S. patent reforms and discussion on their
plausible implications. Jaffe (2000) analyses the major changes in the U.S. patent policy during the 1980s
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for higher damage awards, enhanced upto one to three times, if the infringement is found to
be wilful or malicious. Such punitive awards, although evaluated against strict standards,
remain relatively common in the U.S. and are extant in other jurisdictions such as Europe,
Australia and Canada (Chien et al., 2018). In evaluating patent infringement awards across
jurisdictions, Hu et al. (2020) find that reforms may provide discretionary power to courts
in deciding reasonable damage awards (eg., the Patent Act of 1998 in Japan) and increase
damage amounts (eg., doubling of limits of statutory compensation in China, which prevail
in 90% of the country’s infringement litigations). In the U.S., there has been a surge in
decisions ruled by juries, where juries are significantly more likely than judges to find
patents valid, infringed and wilfully infringed (Moore, 2000). Hence, the primacy of the
amount of damage awards and the success rate of infringement suits in liability rules is
undeniable.
We suppose two mechanisms for tightening indemnification laws - (i) increase in the success
probability of establishing a patent in court of law making damage awards more likely,
i.e. increase in r, and (ii) increase in the entitled restitution of the entrepreneur in case
infringement is successfully established, i.e. increase in δ. Accordingly, a stricter liability
regime augments the measure of strength σ, thus increasing the entrepreneur’s expected
recovery amount σλρi. As this reparation equals the reduction in revenue of the rival (= γρi),
a stronger patent regime characterized by an increase in σ also implies a proportionate
increase in the recovery coefficient γ (λ being exogenously determined).
3.1 Patenting and Movement Decision
Figure 2 illustrates the effects of stronger patents on second period patenting decision of
the entrepreneur and movement decision of the scientist in the ǫi − ǫe space. The solid lines
show the boundaries between patenting vs. not patenting and moving vs. staying decisions
and 1990s, reviews existing studies on their effect on patenting and innovation, and finds a paucity of
robust empirical results. Gallini (2002) provides a background of the U.S. patent reforms and evaluates










S, p = 1
S, p = 0
Figure 2: Effect of Stricter Patent Regime
of the entrepreneur and the scientist respectively. As γ rises, line B (shown in Figure
1) becomes steeper and ǫi1 shifts to the left. The dotted lines show the new boundaries
segregating the decision alternatives of the entrepreneur and the scientist. Regions R1
and R2 denote the values of ǫe and ǫi (and thus, ρe and ρi) for which there is a change of
behaviour. As stronger patents allow the entrepreneur to recover a larger portion of her loss
due to infringement, it is intuitive that she will patent more frequently as the patent regime
tightens. This intuition is indeed true. The entrepreneur now additionally chooses to patent
in both regions R1 and R2, where she was initially not patenting. A stricter regime also
reduces the pay-off that the scientist can generate by marketing his knowledge at a rival
as the rival now has to sustain a higher reparation if the product is patented. Intuition
suggests that this would discourage scientist movement and increase his propensity to stay
with the entrepreneur. However, it turns out that this intuition is not correct. Greater
patent strength has no effect on scientist’s second period movement decision. In region R1
(R2), his initial decision to move (stay) still remains optimal. The following proposition
summarizes the results.
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Proposition 1. The following define the effect of a stronger patent regime on the second
period patenting decision of the entrepreneur and movement decision of the scientist.
(i) Tightening of the patent system increases the entrepreneur’s propensity to patent the
innovation.
(ii) Tightening of the patent system has no effect on the scientist’s propensity to move to
or set up a rival firm.
Proof. See appendix.
First, consider the entrepreneur’s patenting decision. Recall that when the scientist chooses
to move, the entrepreneur patents the innovation to reduce the loss incurred in case of
an infringement. With patenting cost remaining constant, if loss recovery increases the
entrepreneur finds it beneficial to patent even when loss without patenting is not too high.
Alternatively, when the scientist chooses to stay, the entrepreneur uses patenting as a
device to reduce the scientist’s second period wage by limiting his expected pay-off from a
rival. As a higher expected loss recovery augments the reduction in scientist’s expected
pay-off, a stricter damage rule allows greater wage reduction and thus engenders a higher
propensity to patent. Next, consider the scientist’s movement decision. Tightening of the
regime reduces scientist’s expected second period pay-off by increasing the damage liability
incurred by the rival in case the innovation is patented. For any given first period wage,
this lowers the scientist’s total expected pay-off in two periods combined below his total
reservation wage. Therefore, the entrepreneur has to adjust for any such reduction by an
equal increase in the first period wage, in order to be able to hire the scientist for the
development process. Consequently, a stronger patent system leaves the scientist’s total
expected pay-off unaltered, rendering no effect on his second period movement decision.
At this point, it is worthwhile to note an important distinction between our study and a
seemingly related study by Ganco et al. (2015) who also use Kim and Marschke (2005)’s
framework of innovation. They consider a firm’s reputation for litigiousness as a measure
of IP toughness and find that IP toughness reduces scientist mobility through increase in
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prospective patenting12. At first glance, this may seem contrary to our result in Proposition
1(ii). However, notice that Ganco et al. (2015) define IP toughness as a firm’s reputation
for litigiousness whereas our paper defines patent strength as a characteristic of patent laws
which is buttressed by patent reforms. Consequently, they consider litigation propensity to
be exogenously given (as opposed to endogenous patenting in our model), the probability
of patenting being the measure of litigiousness13. Introducing exogenous patenting decision
in our model, we find that an exogenous increase in patenting propensity reduces mobility,
which is in line with Ganco et al. (2015). Corollary 1 summarizes.
Corollary 1. Exogenous increase in patenting propensity reduces scientist mobility.
Proof. See appendix.
Further, Corollary 2 shows that when we consider exogenous patenting á la Ganco et al.
(2015) but increase our “measure of strength” without changing the measure of firm’s
litigiousness, mobility falls, which is in accordance with our result in Proposition 1(ii).
Corollary 2. Increase in patent strength has no effect on scientist mobility when patenting
propensity is exogenously given.
Proof. See appendix.
From Corollary 1 and Corollary 2, it follows that patent toughness due to firm litigiousness
12Agarwal et al. (2009) and Toh and Kim (2013) discuss similar characterizations of IP toughness.
13Patenting propensity in our model may be interpreted as litigation propensity (given that the innovation
is patented). To understand this, consider the probability of occurrence of a patent litigation:
P (Patent litigation) = p · l
where p and l denote the propensity of patenting and litigation, respectively. Our model parameterizes
patenting propensity p and implicitly assumes l = 1 such that P (Patent litigation) = p. That is to say, if
the entrepreneur patents the innovation, the scientist expects her to always litigate in case he infringes, and
therefore makes his equilibrium choices taking into consideration the potential repercussions. Alternatively,
if the innovator owns a patent with certainty implying p = 1, we have P (Patent litigation) = l such that
litigation propensity is the parameter, as in Ganco et al. (2015).
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affects scientist mobility differently as compared to that due to patent reforms. Thus,
extending our model to include Ganco et al. (2015)’s framework of exogenous patenting
helps us generalize our result in Proposition 1(ii), as Corollary 3 delineates.
Corollary 3. Strengthening of the patent regime is inefficacious in deterring mobility
regardless of whether patenting propensity is exogenously given or endogenously determined.
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 1 and Corollary 2.
3.2 Profitability and R&D Expenditure
A stronger patent regime aims to protect innovations from infringement and encourage
R&D activities. Increase in loss recovery due to stronger patents reduces the damage that
the entrepreneur suffers in case a rival appears in the market, and the resulting higher
occurrence of patenting further mitigates such loss. Intuitively then, we would expect a
tightening of the patent system to increase the profitability of the research project. But this
intuition is not valid. On the contrary, the expected profit of the innovating entrepreneur
decreases with an increase in patent strength. The following proposition formalizes the
effect of stronger patents on the entrepreneur’s profitability.
Proposition 2. Strengthening of the patent regime decreases the profitability of the research
project.
Proof. See appendix.
To understand the result, notice that any reduction in the scientist’s expected second
period pay-off must be countered by an equal increase in his first period wage for successful
initiation of the research project. As a stronger patent regime increases expected recovery
cost of the rival thereby reducing the scientist’s expected pay-off, the first period wage
must rise. Now, given a higher first period wage, when the second period arrives it is
optimal for the entrepreneur to patent more frequently. It turns out, the augmentation of
the entrepreneur’s profitability resulting from the benefit of patenting in the second period
is exactly offset by its contraction due to higher wage payment in the first period. However,
17
for any positive cost of patenting (c > 0), greater patenting activity in the second period
increases total cost of patenting incurred by the entrepreneur. Thus, the combined effect of
stronger patents on the entrepreneur’s expected profitability is negative.
Next, we look at the impact of tighter patents on R&D expenditure. Following Kim and
Marschke (2005), we define expected R&D expenditure of the research project as the total
wage bill remunerated to the scientist.
R&D = w0 +
∫∫
S,p=1
w1(p = 1)g(ǫe, ǫi) dǫedǫi +
∫∫
S,p=0




[ρ̄e + ǫe − γρ̄i − γǫi + w̄]g(ǫe, ǫi) dǫedǫi −
∫∫
M,p=0
[ρ̄e + ǫe + w̄]g(ǫe, ǫi) dǫedǫi
(4)
where the second equality comes from the participation constraint of the scientist (equation
2), which is satisfied with equality in equilibrium. The following proposition states the
effect of stronger patents on R&D expenditure of the entrepreneur.
Proposition 3. Strengthening of the patent regime increases the entrepreneur’s R&D
expenditure for the research project.
Proof. See appendix.
A higher recovery amount prompted by a tighter regime incentivizes the entrepreneur to
patent the innovation more often. This has a twofold effect on the scientist’s second period
expected pay-off: (a) more frequent patenting leads to lower gains from moving, and (b)
higher loss recovery increases the cost incurred due to patenting when he moves. As a
result, the entrepreneur has to compensate for the reduction in the scientist’s expected
gain by offering a higher remuneration in the first period, thus rendering launching of the
research project costlier.
In the present context, an increase in R&D expenditure implies an increase in the scientist’s
initial wage offer. Specifically, observe from Figure 1 and Figure 2 that the second period
wage w1 either remains same or falls as σ (and therefore, γ) rises. Thus, the increase in
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total wage offer is induced by an increase in first period wage w0. Further, note from
Figure 1 that (i) w1 ≥ w̄, and (ii) returns from movement must exceed w̄ for movement
to occur. As the scientist’s expected earning equals his reservation wage in two periods
(= 2w̄) in equilibrium, we have w0 ≤ w̄ implying a negative wage differential for R&D (as
compared to non-R&D wage) equal to w0− w̄ in period 1. A stricter patent system entails a
higher joining wage for the scientist and reduces magnitude of the wage differential, thereby
potentially attracting greater scientist talent to the R&D sector.
4 Conclusion
This paper studies the issue of patent strength in presence of probabilistic patents or partial
recovery guarantee when an innovating firm encounters threat of infringement from its own
research aid. The findings show that strengthening the patent system to ensure higher
expected damage recovery to a patent owner not only fails to reduce the threat of mobility
of the scientist, it further exacerbates the woes of the innovator by adversely affecting
the expected profitability of the entrepreneur. These findings shed light on an important
point to consider regarding reforms of the patent system - the end goal of patents is to
protect innovation incentives and attempts at strengthening the patent system must remain
cognizant of this goal. However, stronger patents may attract greater scientist talent by
mitigating the negative differential between R&D and non-R&D wage through an increase
in the required R&D investment for the innovation.
The present study defines damage awards using the “lost profit” rule. However, a similar
analysis follows when the underlying patent system imposes the “unjust enrichment” damage
regime. It can be easily checked that the effects of a stricter patent regime on patenting
behaviour of the innovating firm, movement behaviour of the scientist, and the profitability
and R&D expenditure of the entrepreneur remain exactly as under the “lost profit” damage
regime characterized in this paper. The reason is as follows. When the rival is required to
forego profit under the “unjust enrichment” rule, the scientist’s expected second period
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pay-off falls. This is analogous to a devaluation of the scientist’s knowledge to the rival
in the second period. The entrepreneur, then, must offer a higher first period wage to
induce the scientist to join her development project. These equal and opposite effects of the
strengthening of the patent system leaves the scientist’s total expected pay-off unaltered,
thus having no effect on his second period movement decision. However, when the second
period arrives, the entrepreneur finds it optimal to patent the innovation more often, thus
increasing patenting expenditure and reducing profitability, with the higher first period wage
resulting in an overall higher R&D expenditure. It is evident that the results of this analysis
will continue to hold in a more general framework encompassing a linear combination of
the two types of damage rules discussed here14. However, a full characterization of the
generalized case is beyond the scope of this paper and remains open for future research.
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Appendix
Construction of Figure 1
Suppose ρe > λρi or ǫe > λρ̄i − ρ̄e + λǫi. As γρi = σλρi, the inequality holds irrespective
of whether the product is patented. The scientist always moves to a rival earning ρe + w̄
(or ρe − γρi + w̄ if patented). Patenting occurs when the cost of patenting is less than the
reduction in loss due to patenting, i.e. σλρi ≥ c or ǫi ≥
c
σλ
− ρ̄i =⇒ ǫi ≥
c
γ
− ρ̄i. This case
corresponds to the area above line A in Figure 1.
Suppose ρe ≤ λρi or ǫe ≤ λρ̄i − ρ̄e + λǫi. But ρe − γρi + w̄ > w̄ =⇒ ǫe > γρ̄i − ρ̄e + γǫi.
The entrepreneur offers wage w1 = ρe + w̄ (or w1 = ρe − γρi + w̄ when patented) and the
scientist chooses to stay. Patenting occurs when savings in wage exceeds patenting cost i.e.
γρi ≥ c =⇒ ǫi ≥
c
γ
− ρi. This case corresponds to the area between lines A and B.
Suppose 0 < ρe ≤ γρi =⇒ −ρ̄e < ǫe ≤ γρ̄i − ρ̄e + γǫi. Without patent, the scientist
considers moving to a rival, hence second period wage offered by the entrepreneur must be
w1 = ρe + w̄. When the product is patented, it is sufficient to offer the reservation wage
to persuade the scientist to stay, i.e. w1 = w̄. Patenting occurs when the wage reduction
exceeds the patenting cost, ρe ≥ c =⇒ ǫe ≥ c − ρ̄e. This case corresponds to the area
between lines B and C.
Finally, suppose ρe ≤ 0 =⇒ ǫe ≤ −ρ̄e. The scientist then never finds it optimal to move
to a rival and the entrepreneur offers wage w1 = w̄ to retain the scientist. Patenting does
not occur in this case. This corresponds to the area below line C.
It is easy to see now why the scientist never finds it optimal to move to the non-R&D sector.
As long as moving to the rival yields higher returns to the scientist, the scientist will either
move to a rival or stay with the entrepreneur, but never move to the non-R&D sector (i.e.
when ρe + w̄ > w̄ without patenting or ρe − γρi + w̄ > w̄ with patenting). When moving
to the rival renders lower returns than moving to the non-R&D sector, the entrepreneur’s
loss from the scientist leaving exceeds the required wage for retaining the scientist, thus
inducing the entrepreneur to offer w1 = w̄ and retain the scientist.
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Proof of Lemma 1
Replacing the expected second period pay-off of the scientist in equation 2 with equality:



























































[ρ̄e + ǫe + w̄]g(ǫe, ǫi) dǫedǫi
where ǫi0 = −ρ̄i, ǫi1 =
c
γ
−ρ̄i, ǫe1 = −ρ̄e, ǫe2 = c−ρ̄e, ǫeA = λρ̄i−ρ̄e+λǫi, ǫeB = γρ̄i−ρ̄e+γǫi.



























































[ρ̄e + ǫe + w̄]g(ǫe, ǫi) dǫedǫi
]
Substituting this in the equation for expected profit, we have:
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E(π) = − 2w̄ +
[





































































[ρ̄i + ǫi − λρ̄i − λǫi]g(ǫe, ǫi) dǫedǫi
=⇒ E(π) = − w̄ +
∫∫
S
ρif(ρe, ρi) dρedρi +
∫∫
M








The fourth term vanishes as σλρi = γρi. Hence the proof. 
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Proof of Proposition 1
We assume ǫe and ǫi are independent normally distributed random variables with ǫe ∼
N (0, σ2e) and ǫi ∼ N (0, σ
2
i ).




(i) Effect of a Stricter Patent Regime on Patenting Behavior
Patenting occurs when σλρi(= γρi) ≥ c given that ρe > γρi or when ρe ≥ c given that
0 < ρe ≤ γρi. When ρe ≤ 0, patenting never occurs. There is no other case in which
patenting occurs. Accordingly, the probability of patenting is:
P (p = 1) = P (γρi ≥ c
∣
∣ ρe > γρi) + P (ρe ≥ c
∣
∣ 0 < ρe ≤ γρi)
= P (γρ̄i + γǫi ≥ c
∣
∣ ǫe > γρ̄i + γǫi − ρ̄e)
+ P (ǫe ≥ c− ρ̄e
∣
∣ − ρ̄e < ǫe ≤ γρ̄i + γǫi − ρ̄e) (i)











ǫe > γρ̄i + γǫi − ρ̄e
)
=









where PN1 and PD1 denote the numerator and denominator, respectively, of the first
term T1.


































Denominator, PD1 = P (ǫe > γρ̄i + γǫi − ρ̄e)









































































= 0 by (i.a) and
∂PD1
∂γ
< 0 by (i.b).








−ρ̄e < ǫe ≤ γρ̄i+γǫi−ρ̄e
)
=
P (−ρ̄e < ǫe ≤ γρ̄i + γǫi − ρ̄e ∩ ǫe ≥ c− ρ̄e)





where PN2 and PD2 denote the numerator and denominator, respectively, of the second
term T2.
Numerator, PN2 = P (−ρ̄e < ǫe ≤ γρ̄i + γǫi − ρ̄e ∩ −ρ̄e + c ≤ ǫe)
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= P (−ρ̄e + c ≤ ǫe ≤ γρ̄i + γǫi − ρ̄e)
= P (ǫe ≤ γρ̄i + γǫi − ρ̄e)− P (ǫe < −ρ̄e + c)











































Denominator, PD2 = P (−ρ̄e < ǫe ≤ γρ̄i + γǫi − ρ̄e)












































. Further, notice that the range of ǫe




















P (p = 1) = T1 + T2 by (i)








> 0 by (ii) and (iii)
Hence, the proof. 
(ii) Effect of a Stricter Patent Regime on Movement Behavior
Movement occurs when ρe > λρi =⇒ ǫe > λρ̄i − ρ̄e + λǫi. Accordingly, the probability
of movement is:





















An increase in patent strength (σ), induced by an increase in litigation success probability
(r) or recovery proportion (δ) or both, implies an increase in the recovery coefficient (γ).
It is evident that
∂P (M)
∂γ
= 0. Hence, the proof. 
Proof of Corollary 1
Let p be the exogenously given probability with which the innovating entrepreneur patents
the innovation.
Entrepreneur’s expected loss from movement:
w̄ + λρi − p.(σλρi) + p.c
where λρi is the total loss if movement occurs and σλρi is the recovery from patenting. c is
the cost of patenting.
Scientist’s expected return from movement:
w̄ + ρe − p.(σλρi)
where ρe is the return at a rival and σλρi is the damage cost borne in case the innovation
is patented.
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Movement occurs when scientist’s expected gain from movement exceeds entrepreneur’s
potential loss due to movement:
w̄ + ρe − p.(σλρi) > w̄ + λρi − p.(σλρi) + p.c
=⇒ ρe > λρi + p.c












ǫ′e1 = −ρ̄e + p · c
Figure A.1: Movement Decision under Exogenous Patenting Propensity
In Figure A.1, line A defines the boundary for movement decision in (iv) at p = 0. This
corresponds to line A in Figure 1, which determines movement behavior under endogenous
patenting decision. Increase in p shifts line A in Figure A.1 up, to line A’, say, thereby
reversing movement decision in region R. Therefore, an exogenous increase in patenting
propensity deters scientist mobility in region R. Hence, the proof. 
Proof of Corollary 2
It directly follows from the determining condition for mobility in (iv) that an increase in
patent strength (σ), induced by an increase in litigation success probability (r) or recovery
proportion (δ) or both does not alter mobility when patenting propensity is exogenously
given. 
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Proof of Proposition 2
Writing the expected profit of the entrepreneur using Lemma 1:






































































































[ρ̄i + ǫi]g(ǫe, ǫi)
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− ρ̄i) dǫe (vi)
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− ρ̄i) dǫe (vii)
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− ρ̄i) dǫe (ix)














− ρ̄i) dǫe (x)










− ρ̄i) dǫe (xi)
It can be easily seen that (v)+ (vi)+ (vii)+ (viii)+ (ix)+ (x) = 0 and (xi) < 0.
Hence the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3
Writing the expression for R&D expenditure using equation (4):














[ρ̄e + ǫe + w̄]g(ǫe, ǫi) dǫedǫi
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[ρ̄e + ǫe + w̄]g(ǫe,
c
γ
− ρ̄i) dǫe (xiv)
























The above expression is positive. Hence the proof. 
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